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L,,;;: SuPK.r:tlli COlJRT OF THE STATE OF UTAtl

LLOYD mu\:'.•':H and
JEANNE "::'._1c.:.::H,
Plaintiffs and
Respondents,
v.
WESTERN PETROLEUM, INC.,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. 17178

)
)

Defendant-Appellant.)

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEMENT AND NATURE OF CASE
Respondents brought this action claiming damages for
the alleged pollution of their water well by formation
water percolating into the underground water system from the
Appellant's evaporation pit.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The case was tried to a jury which found that the Defendant's use of a formation water disposal pit was negligent nnd that the water from Defendant's pit had caused 66%
of the pollution of the Plaintiffs' first well and 52% of
the pollution of the Plaintiffs' second well.

The remaining

pollution was found to have been caused by other parties or
conditions.

The jury awarded general and special damages to
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the Plaintiffs together with a $13,000.00 punitive damage

award.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPSAL
Appellant seeks to have this court remand the case for
a new trial; or in the alternative, to apportion the damages
awarded and to delete or reduce the punitive damage award.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiffs-Respondents, Branches, filed this action alleging that formation water from the Defendant's evaporation
pit had run onto the Plaintiffs' land causing damage to the
Plaintiffs, and that the formation water had percolated into
the underground water system causing the water in the Plaintiffs' water wells to become unfit for culinary use, causing
damages including a decrease in the value of the Plaintiffs'
land.
The Plaintiffs are the purchasers of a parcel of property located in a rural area North of Roosevelt, Utah. The
property was purchased in December of 1976 at a purchase
price of $37,000.00. (T.17,163)
occupied by the Plaintiffs.

On the property is a home

Water for the use of the home

at the time of purchase was obtained from a well which had
been drilled sometime prior to 1930. (T.17-18)

In November

of 1977, Plaintiffs drilled a new well next to their home to
obtain water for household use. (T.32)
The land North of the Plaintiffs' property, is owned by
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the Defendant.

Prior to the time Plaintiffs purchased their

property, Defendant maintained on its land a pit into uhich
was placed formation waters.

The Defendant's business

consists of hauling formation waters from oil well sites
and discharging that water into the pit for disposal.
Formation water is underground water brought to the surface
by producing oil wells.

The use of evaporation pits to

dispose of formation water is an accepted procedure in the
oil industry.

(T.170-171)

The Plaintiffs allege that soon after they moved into
the home the water from the older well started to taste bad.
It was their opinion that the water was being contaminated
by water percolating from the evaporation pit into the
underground water supply.

Tests made of the water in Plain-

tiffs' well showed that it contained fluctuating amounts of
minerals.

The Plaintiffs then drilled a new well in Novem-

ber of 1977, obtaining good water. Plaintiffs alleged that
after about two (2) months the water in the new well also
started to taste bad.
In an attempt to ascertain whether the formation water
in the Defendant's evaporation pit was contaminating the
Plaintiffs' culinary water supply, the parties by agreement
performed certain tests.

Results of the tests failed to

show that the water from the evaporation pit was contaminating the Plaintiffs' water supply.

(T.45, 56 and 362)

The parties also retained experts to study the geological
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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and underground water systems to determine whether the
Plaintiffs' wells were being contaminated by the Defendant's
evaporation pits or by other sources.

One of those experts

was Edward Ferris who made an extensive study of the underground water system and presented to the court and the jury
his conclusions.

(T.337)

Mr. Ferris' study showed that the naturally occurring
underground water in the area around the Branch home consisted
of two (2) sources.

The first layer of underground water

was referred to as "shallow ground water", which water was
not suitable for culinary use.

Some of the water from De-

fendant's pit was percolating into this natural shallow
ground water.

(T.345)

The deeper source of underground

water was referred to as the Duchesne Formation aquifer.
This aquifer was pressurized and contained waters suitable
for human consumption, but of substandard quality.

Several

homes in the area used water from this aquifer for culinary
purposes.

(T.453-55)

Mr. Ferris testified that the water in the Plaintiffs'
old well was contaminated as a result of the casing having
rusted away over the years.

(T.342 and 345)

As a result of

the casing rusting away, extremely poor quality shallow
ground water was entering the well through the casing thereby
contaminating the suitable water in the well.

Because of

the rusted casing, the water from the old well would have
been of substandard quality even if the Defendant's disposal
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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pit hacl not been in existence.

(T.347)

Even with the Defrn-

dant's pit, the contamination in the old well was 75 percent
caused by the natural poor quality groundwater and only 25
percent from water percolating from the evaporation pit.
(T. 456-58)

The study on the new well showed that if it was properly drilled and cased into the Duchesne Formation aquifer
it was impossible for water from the Defendant's disposal
pit to

e~ter

it.

(T.454-458)

The water samples from the new

well showed that in fact the new well had not been contaminatetl by the Defendant's evaporation pit, but rather contained only water found in the Duchesne Formation aquifer
which,

in its nacural state, is of substandard quality.

(T.Lf55)
Testimony of the various witnesses was that any contamination of the Plaintiffs' well could come from several
sources including natural salts contained in the earth,
(T. 128, 450), improper casing of the wells,

(T. 3lf2), the

septic tank system of the Plaintiffs located near the wells
(T.

68), and activities of third parties which may affect

the underground water system.
The case was submitted to the jury in the form of
sp~cial interrozatocies.

The court instructed the jury

reg~rding negli3ence and the standard of care of a reasonably prudent person.

It refused, however, to instruct
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the jury as to proximate cause as requested by the Defen-

dant.

(Defendant's Proposed Jury Instructions !l.94)

The

trial court also had the jury find the percentage of pollution of the Plaintiffs' well caused by the Defendant and the
percentage of pollution caused by other parties or conditions.
The court, however, refused to submit to the jury the question
of the percentage of negligence attributable to each party
as requested by the Defendant and as required by Utah Code
Ann.

§78-27-38.

(Special Interrogatories R.140)

The jury,

in reply to the question on percentage of causation, found
that in relation to the Plaintiffs' first well, the Defendant had caused 66 percent of the pollution and other
parties or conditions 34 percent of the pollution.

In

relation to the Plaintiffs' new well, the jury found the Defendant had caused 52 percent of the pollution, and other
parties or conditions 48 percent of the pollution.
151)

(R.147-

The court, however, refused to reduce the amount of

damages found by the jury by the percentage of pollution
caused by other parties.

The court awarded to the Plaintiffs

$3,250.00 for the decrease in value of their property; $700.00
for costs of water tests, surveying, etc.; $3,000.00 for the
cost of drilling the new well; $13,000.00 for punitive
damages; and $10,000.00 for inconvenience, annoyance and
mental suffering.

(R.270)

T~e

$10,000.00 award for incon-

venience, annoyance and mental suffering was deleted by the
court for the reason that it had not been pled nor proven,
nor had the jury been properly instructed on that issue.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

(R.259,27n)

Th2 court, how2ver, refused to delete or

reduce the award of punitive damages.
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POINT I
WHERE THE DEFENDANT WAS CHARGED WITH
NEGLIGENCE THE DEFENDANT WAS ENTITLED
TO AN INSTRUCTION REGARDING PROXIMATE
CAUSE AND A FINDING BY THE JURY THAT
THE DEFENDANT'S NEGLIGENT ACTIONS WERE
THE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE PLAINTIFFS'
INJURIES.
The legal issues arising out of the alleged pollution
of underground water systems through the operation of pits
to dispose of formation waters, have not previously been
considered by the Utah Supreme Court, insofar as counsel can
determine.

Those issues have been considered, however, by

states such as Oklahoma and Texas which have had extensive
oil well development and where the use of pits is a coI'1l!lon
practice in disposing of formation waters.

In the juris-

dictions which have considered similar cases, the courts
have held that the plaintiff must base its case for recovery
either on the theory of nuisance or negligence and in a few
jurisdictions the theory of trespass has been allowed.
General Crude Oil Co. v. Aiken 344 S.W.2d 668 (Tex. 1961),
Ross v. Fink 378 P.2d 1011 (Okla. 1963), Turner v. Big Lake
Oil Co. 128 Tex. 155, 96 S.W.2d 221 (1936), United Fuel
Gas Co. v. Sa-wyers 259 S.W.2d 466 (Ken. 1951), 38 A.L.R.2d.
1261, 1285 and 39 A.L.R.3d. 910, 921.
The verdict found by the jury and the judgment of the
trial court in this case -were apparently based on the
theory of negligence.

The trial court instructed the jury
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i.:~c·t1c2

2nd there'

\"dS

a fincli0g by the jury that

the Defendant had been negligent in dumping formation water
in the evaporation pit.

(Jury Instructions Numbers 6, 7 and

8 and· Interrogatory Number 17, R. 116-139)

Since the Plain.,-

tiffs did not claim that their theory was based on nuisance
or trespass and furthermore, since the Plaintiffs did not request the trial court to instruct the jury as to nuisance
or trespass, those theories were waived by the Plaintiffs and
could not have been.used by the trial court or the jury in
reaching its verdict.

Therefore, the only accepted theory

upon which this case could be based is negligence.
The trial court instructed the jury as to negligence,
but it refused to instruct the jury as to proximate cause as
requested by the Defendant.

Proximate cause is a question of

fact for the jury and not an issue to be decided by the court.
Rallow_:Y_,__Ogd~n_

City 66 Utah 475,243 P. 791 (1926). As stated

in llaar std.ck v. Oregon Short Line Railroad Co. 70 Utah 552, 262
P. 100 (1927),
[I)t is a fundamental principal of the law of negligence
that no matter how gross the negligence complained of
may be, it creates no liability unless it is the proximate cause of the injury. Id. at 559.
In cases involving the alleged pollution of water
wells, the plaintiff has the burden of showing that the
defendant's negligence is the proximate cause of the pollution of the Plaintiffs' well and the resulting damages.
l\ai_12__\!-._~~- 293 P. 2d 359 (Okla. 1956), SunRay Mid-

..

Continental
Oil
Co. Lawv.Library.
Tisdale
366provided
P.2d
(Okla.
1961)
.
Sponsored by the
S.J. Quinney
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The trial court's refusal to instruct che> j 1:r; o:-i
proximate cause was error.

This error was not corrected

by requesting the jury to find whether the Defendant's use
of the disposal pit was a cause of the pollution of the
water in Plaintiffs' well.
138, Question No. 7)

(R.136,Question No. 2 and R.

The jury's answers to those questions

are not meaningful when one must apply the answers in
trying to formulate a judgment which requires that one's
negligence be the proximate cause of the harm.
In some cases, a cause and proximate cause would be
synonymous.

However, in the instant case that is not true.

The testimony at the trial showed that there were several
possible causes of the pollution of the Plaintiffs' well,
including poor subsurface ground water, rusted casings, the
Plaintiffs' septic tank system, and unknown third parties.
The jury also found that there were other causes of the
pollution of the well.

Furthermore, the Plaintiffs them-

selves, in a separate lawsuit, sued the person who drilled
the well, claiming that he was the cause of the pollution of
the well. (R. 206-07)
Because there was evidence indicating that there were
several possible causes of the pollution of the Plaintiffs'
well, it was imperative that the jury be instructed on
proximate cause and be allowed to make a factual deterPJination of that issue.

The Court's refusal to instruct the
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jury on proximate cause and the failure: .of the jury to fin'l
that the Defendant's actions were the proximate cause of the
Plaintiffs' injury, is not in accordance

~1ith

the established

law of this jurisdiction or other jurisdictions.

Both

precedent and reason support a reversal of the verdict in
this case and a remand for a new trial.
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POIN'.l II.
THE TRIAL COURT'S FAILURE TO DIRECT
THE JURY TO FIND THE PERCENTAGE OF
NEGLIGENCE ATTRIBUTABLE TO EACH PARTY
AS REQUIRED BY UTAH CODE ANN. §78-2738 WAS REVERSIBLE ERROR.
The comparative negligence statute, Utah Code Ann. §7827-38 provides that,
The Court may, and when requested by any party,
shall, direct the jury to find separate special verdicts determining ... (2) the percentage of negligence
attributable to each party; and the Court shall then
reduce the amount of the damages in propJrtion to the
amount of negligence attributable to the person seeking
recovery.
(Emphasis added).
In the present case, the Defendant requested the trial
court to direct the jury to find separate special verdicts
determining the percentage of negligence attributable to
each party.

(Plaintiffs' Proposed Verdict Form, R.113)

The

trial court, however, refused the request to find the percentage of negligence attributable to each party.

Instead

it instructed the jury to determine (1) whether the Defendant was negligent "in dumping formation water in its evaporation pit." (R.139, Question No. 17) and (2) the percentage
of the pollution of Plaintiffs' well caused by the Defendant' s dumping and the percentage caused by third par-ties.

The trial court refused to instruct the jury to

determine whether the Plaintiffs were negligent and if so,
the percent of negligence attributable to the Plaintiffs.
The evidence showed that the Plaintiffs or their agents may
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i

lHve been neL;ligent in the maintainence of the casings of
the wells

~~J

that the Plaintiffs' septic tank system may

hnve contributed to the pollution of the well.

It is pos-

s.Lule that the jury, if asked, could have found Plaintiffs
mo-ce negli<;en t than Defendant.
Utah Code Ann.

§78-27-38 specifically requires that the

Court direct the jury to enter separate verdicts as to the
percent of negligence attributable to each party.

The trial

court's failure to instruct the jury makes it impossible for
the couri: to use the interrogatories answered by the jury as
a basis for the judgment.

Therefore, a new trial should be

granted so that the jury can be properly instructed and
proper questions submitted to the jury relating to the percentage of negligence attributable to each party.
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POINT III
NOTWITHSTANDING THE TRIAL COURT'S FAILURE TO INSTRUCT THE JURY TO FIND THE
PERCENTAGE OF NEGLIGENCE OF THE PLAINTIFFS AND APPORTION THE DA."1AGES, THE
TRIAL COURT SHOULD HAVE AT LEAST REDUCED THE DAMAGES BY THE PERCENTAGE
OF POLLUTION FOUND BY THE JURY TO BE
CAUSED BY OTHER PARTIES OR CONDITIONS.
Utah Code Ann. §78-27-37 and Utah Code Ann. §78-27-38
require that the damages be reduced by the proportion of
neglige~ce

attributable to the party seeking recovery.

Not having the requisite finding by the jury to formulate the judgment in accordance with Utah Statute, the Court
should have followed the common law rule of apportionment.
The rule is that if an independent tort-feaser pollutes
a water supply, damages are apportioned according to the
percent of pollution attributable to that party.

Monroe

Carp Pond Co. v. River Raisin Paper Co. 240 Mich. 279, 215
N.W. 325 (1927).

As stated in R. Clark, Water and Water

Rights, §219.3(B),
The division of apportionable harm among several
defendants is undoubtedly based upon considerations of
fairness. It seems wrong to hold a defendant liable
for the entire damages where it is known that he is
responsible for only a part. Whatever apportionment is
permitted by the nature of the case, although inexact,
is usually better than no apportionment at all .... Id.
at 186.
In the present case, the trial court did ask the jury
to find the percent of pollution caused by the DefendRnt and
the percent of the pollution caused by other parties or
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

condi tiuns.

Th2 jury,

in response to those questions, found

that the Defendant had caused 66/'o of the pollution of Plaintiffs' old well with other parties or conditions causing
34% of the pollution in that well.

The jury further found

that the Defendant had caused 52% of the pollution of the
Plaintiffs' new well and that other parties or conditions
had caused 48% of the pollution of that well.

(R.147-151)

Since the trial court failed to instruct the jury to
find the percentage of negligence attributable to the Plaintiffs, it was impossible to apportion the damages found by
the jury as required by Utah Code Ann. §78-27-37.

Not only

did the Court not apportion the damages according to the
negligence of the parties, it failed to reduce the damage
award against Defendant by the percentage pollution the jury
found caused by parties other than Defendant.

Fairness and

precedent require that the damages be reduced by the percent
of pollution attributable to others so that the Defendant is
not required to pay for damages which were not caused by it.
The trial court's refusal to apportion the damages, as found
by the jury, was error, and the case should be remanded with
instructions by this Court to apportion the damages in
accordance with the findings of the jury.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-15-

POEJT IV
THE ACTIONS OF THE DUCHESNE COUNTY
CLERK'S OFFICE IN EXCUSING ALL PROSPECTIVE JURORS WHO DESIRED TO GO ELK
HUNTING VIOLATED THE JURY SELECTION
AND SERVICE ACT, AND THE DEFENDANT
IS ENTITLED TO NEW TRIAL WITH A PROPERLY SELECTED JURY OR A HEARING TO
DETERMINE IF THE DEFENDANT WAS PREJUDICED.
The procedure for qualification and selection of juries
in the State of Utah is set forth in the Jury Selection and
Service Act.

Utah Code Ann. §78-46-1, et

~-

Utah Code

Ann. §78-46-13 provides that the clerk of the court, under
the direction of the judge, shall draw a jury panel at
random from the qualified jury wheel.

The persons then

selected for jury service are to be notified by the court
when and where they are to report for service.

Section 78-

46-15 provides that if a prospective juror desires to be
excused from jury service, the court shall make that determination based upon the information provided on the jury
qualification form or by an interview with the prospective
juror.

If it is determined that the juror should be ex-

cused, that should be entered on the jury qualification
form.
Section 78-46-16 sets forth the procedure by which a
party challenges the selection of the jury.

That Section

provides that the challenge should be made within seven (7)

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

J~ys

~ftcr

the party discovers the grounds for the challenge

and in any event before the jury is sworn to try the case.
Upon a motion filed setting forth a sworn statement of facts
which if true would constitute a substantial failure to
comply with the act, the moving party is entitled to present
testimony on the question of whether the jury was properly
selected and on the question of whether the moving party was
prejudiced as a result of the improper selection of jury.
The trial in this case was scheduled so as to include
the opening day of elk hunting season in Utah.

After the

jury was sworn, passed for cause and impaneled and after the
trial had started, counsel for the Defendant was informed by
the Duchesne County Clerk's Office that since the opening
day of elk season was the same day as the trial, the clerk's
office had contacted all prospective jurors and inquired as
to whether or not they desired to go elk hunting.

(R.173)

Any prospective jurors who expressed a desire to go elk
hunting were then removed from the jury. list and not summoned for jury duty.

The Defendant was not aware of these

facts prior to the time the jury was sworn, and, therefore,
was unable to file a motion challenging the selection of the
jury.

However, on receipt of this information, Defendant

filed, with the trial court, a motion requesting a new trial
or a hearing to determine whether the jury selection was
proper.

If the determination was made that the jury selection
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was not proper and the Defendant had been prejudiced, the
Defendant should have been granted a new trial.

The court

denied the Defendant's motion and ·refused to hold a hearing
or grant a new trial.
The right of a party to be judged by a properly selected
jury is an important facet of the American legal system.
The excusing of all prospective jurors who desired to go elk
hunting by the Duchesne County Clerk's Office deprived the
Defendant of a proper jury leaving the Defendant with a
jury composed of parties not familiar with the oil industry.
The Defendant is at least entitled to a hearing to determine
whether the jury selection was proper and if not, whether the
Defendant was prejudiced.

The failure of the trial court

to grant such a hearing, or in the alternative to grant to
the Defendant a new trial with a properly selected jury, was
error and the case should be remanded for a new trial.
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POINT V
THE AWARD OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES BY THE
JURY WITHOUT A SHOWING THAT THE DEFENDANT'S ACTIONS WERE WILLFUL AND
HALICIOUS, WAS IMPROPER AND UNDER THE
INFLUENCE OF PASSION OR PREJUDICE
AND THEREFORE THE PUNITIVE DAMAGE
AWARD SHOULD BE DELETED OR AT LEAST
REDUCED.
Punitive damages must not be awarded unless the evidence
shows that the defendant's actions were willful and malicious.
Kesler v. Rogers 542 P.2d 354 (Utah 1975), Palombi v. D & C
Builders 22 Utah 2d 297,452 P.2d 325 (1969), Powers v.
Taylor 14 Utah 2d 152,309 P.2d 380, (1963), Smoot v. Lund 13
Utah 2d 168, 369 P.2d 933 (1962) and Evans v. Gaisford 122
Utah 156, 247 P.2d 431 (1952).

Punitive damages are not to

be awarded if the conduct of the Plaintiff was just wrongful,
Kesler v. Rogers at 356, or if the defendant's conduct was
careless.

Palombi v. D & C Builders at 328.

The court in

allowing punitive damages must do so with caution, lest
engendered by passion or prejudice, the award becomes unrealistic or unreasonable.

Kesler v. Rogers at 359.

As

this Court has stated,
[T]he damages so assessed must appear to have some
basis in reason in relation to the wrongful act, the
manner and intent with which it was done, the injury
inflicted and the actual damage suffered.
Powers v. Taylor at 383.
In Kesler v. Rogers, this Court compared the $10,000.00
punitive damage award to the $25,403.17 actual damage and
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the wrongful taking by the defendant of plaintiff's cattle
and held that the $10,000.00 punitive damage award was
disproportionate to the actual damages and the injury caused
and reduced the punitive damage award to $5,000.00.
Lawsuits involving pollution of water systems by oil
companies have often result in large punitive damage awards
as a result of passion or prejudice, and the courts have
felt compelled to either reduce or delete those damages. In
Cities Service Oil Co. v. Merritt 332 P.2d 677 (Okla.
1958), the court, in reviewing the actual damage suffered by
the plaintiff, reduced the punitive damage awards from
$500.00 to $200.00 and from $4,500.00 to $1,800.00.

In

Cooperative Refinery Ass'n. v. Young 393 P.2d 537 (Okla.
1964), the court deleted from rhe judgment the $600.00
punitive damage award on the basis that the defendant had
not acted willfully and maliciously, but had acted in good
faith.

Furthermore, it has been held that in applying the

doctrine of comparative negligence, the punitive damage
award should be reduced by the percent of negligence attributable to other parties.

Pedernales Electric Cooperative,

Inc. v. Schulz 583 S.W.2d. 882 (Tex. 1979).
Tampa Electric Co. v. Stone

Contra.

& Webster Engineering Corp. (DC

Fla.) 367 F.Supp 27.
The Plaintiffs failed to produce any evidence showing

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-20-

_..

that the actions of the Defendant were willful and malicious.
Rather, the evidence showed that the Defendant's evaporation
pit was in operation when the Plaintiffs first purchased
their property, and that when the Plaintiffs complained to
the Defendant claiming that their water well was being polluted, the Defendant went to great lengths and expense to
determine if the pit was the cause of any pollution.

De-

fendant met with the Plaintiffs and agreed to institute a
dye test and a water sampling test to determine whether the
water in the evaporation pit was polluting the Plaintiffs'
water system.

Both of those tests failed to show that the

water from Defendant's pit was polluting the Plaintiffs'
well. In addition, the Defendant hired two (2) different
experts in the field to run tests and to examine the geology
of the area to determine whether or not the evaporation pit
was polluting the Plaintiffs' well.

The conclusion of both

of those experts was that the Defendant was not polluting
the Plaintiffs' water well, but rather the pollution was
from some other source.

In addition, the Defendant constructed

catch ponds to prevent seepage from the pit from running
onto the Plaintiffs' property and expended a great amount of
money hauling water from the catch ponds so as to prevent
the water from running onto the Plaintiffs' property.

Even

the Plaintiffs' counsel admitted in his closing arguments
that the actions of the Defendant were not willful and
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malicious, but were at best a reckless indifference for the
Plaintiffs' rights. (T.502-03)
The instruction given to the jury by the trial court
was improper and not in accordance with Utah law in that it
allowed the jury to assess punitive damages on a showing by
the Plaintiffs that the Defendant's conduct was with reckless indifference and disregard of the rights of the Plaintiffs.

It was this improper language in the instruction

that the Plaintiffs' counsel relied on when arguing to the
jury that punitive damages should be awarded.

Since there

was no showing that the befendant's actions were willful and
malicious, the Defendant requested the court to instruct the
jury that punitive damages were not allowed in this case.
(T.398-99, and Defendant's Proposed Jury Instruction R.108)
The court refused the proposed instruction by the Defendant.
The court did, however, state to Defendant's counsel that it
would instruct the jury that it could only award punitive
damages if there was a showing that the action of the Defendant was willful, malicious and wanton.
414)

(T.402-04, Lfl2 and

However, when the court instructed the jury, it

added the additional language relating to reckless indifference and disregard.

The jury instruction was erroneous,

not in accordance with Utah law, and the punitive damage
award should be deleted.
In the event the Court determines that the punitive
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damage award should not be deleted, the award should at
least be reduced since it was obviously awarded under passion
or prejudice.

As noted supra, punitive damage awards under

similar factual situations have shown that the verdicts
awarded by the jury were under the influence of passion or
prejudice.

Furthermore,

the trial court indicated in an

earlier ruling that it considered the punitive damage award
excessive when it reduced that award to $5,000.00, but later
reinstated it when deleting the award for inconvenience, annoyance and mental suffering.

(R.258)

A comparison of the punitive damages of $13,000.00 to
the actual damages awarded to the Plaintiffs of approximately
$9,000.00, shows that the punitive damage award is disproportionate to the injury and was awarded under passion or
prejudice especially in light of the fact that the jury
panel had been improperly selected.

Fairness to the Defen-

dant requires that the punitive damages be deleted or at
least reduced.
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CONCLUSION
The trial court's failure to adequately instruct the
jury regarding proximate cause and punitive damages and its
failure to have the jury answer interrogatories to provide
the necessary information needed to apply the law of negligence and comparative negligence resulted in a meaningless
jury verdict.

It is in the best interest of the parties

that this Court remand this case to the trial court with
instructions regarding the correct law to be applied.

A

jury verdict which deciqes whether the Defendant's negligence was the proximate cause rather than a cause of the
Plaintiffs' injury, together with a finding regarding the
percentage of negligence of the Plaintiffs, would allow the
Court to enter a judgment fair to both parties.

A new trial

would also remove the question as to whether the Defendant
received a fair trial due to the improper manner in which
the jury was selected.
In the event the Court does not remand the case for a
new trial, justice requires a reduction in the damages
awarded. The Defendant should not be required to pay for the
damages attributable to pollution which the jury found to be
caused by other parties and conditions, especially when the
other parties could have been the Plaintiffs and the other
conditions could have been the poor quality of the underround water in its natural state.
Punitive damages should only be awarded when the Defen-
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dant's actions are wilful and malicious.

The Plaintiffs'

counsel in the closing arguments admitted that the Defendant's actions were not wilful and malicious.

The award of

punitive damages by the jury resulted from the improper jury
instruction and passion or prejudice. Such an award of
punitive damages should be deleted or at least reduced.
Appellant, therefore, submits that the jury verdict
should be reversed and the matter remanded for a new trial.
Respectfully submitted this

11

~

day of September,

1980.

MCKEACHNIE & ALLRED, P.C.
53 South 200 East
Vernal, Utah 84078
789-4908
Attorneys for Defendant-Appellant
Western Petroleum, Inc.
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